My blogging co hort Josh Levy, of Win The War, was able to catch General Odierno, recently retired number 2 in Iraq, at the Heritage Foundation. Here is his report...
March 5, 2008, WASHINGTON – General Odierno spoke at the Heritage Foundation this morning regarding the changes in Iraq over the last fifteen months and where the nation is headed now. Following his brief remarks, which lasted about twenty minutes, he responded to questions for about half-an-hour.
Gen. Odierno was introduced by James Carafano, Assistant Research Director and Senior Research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, who pointed out that Gen. Odierno has now fought in “The Long War” longer than American generals fought in World War II. Gen. Odierno then rose to present a vigorous defense of the success thus far of the new strategy that Multi-National Forces in Iraq began implementing early in 2007, but warned that serious threats and obstacles remain and that full success would take many years more. A tall, robust man with a determined regard, Gen. Odierno’s bearing itself seemed to communicate a conviction that victory could and should be achieved, despite the additional time and sacrifices required.
Video of the event will be available soon at http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/archive.cfm and http://www.c-span.org/.
The following is a summary of his address.
REVIEWING THE LAST 15 MONTHS
Fifteen months ago, sectarian attacks in Iraq were rising. After the first Samarra mosque bombing in February of 2006, there was a steady run of high-profile attacks. Young men, feeling the need to defend themselves, their homes and neighborhoods, were driven to joining militias. By launching attacks themselves, however, these militias only fueled the cycle of violence, leading to an escalating series of reprisals. They tolerated the presence of extremists because the Iraqi army and police force would not, and indeed could not, provide security. Survival alone became the imperative and alliances were formed along sectarian lines.
In November 2006 alone, nearly 2000 Iraqis were killed. Even more were killed in December. The situation in Anbar province, one of the most afflicted regions, became “clearer and bleaker,” as the Washington Post put it at the time. A Marine Corps intelligence report concluded that, due to attacks by Al Qaeda in Iraq, meddling by Iran, and insufficient MFN-I troops, the insurgency in Anbar could not be defeated.
Some sheiks were already turning against the extremists, but overall Iraq seemed convulsed by a civil war that seemed only to grow wider and more intense. In some cases, the Iraqi Security Forces were themselves complicit in attacks on the civilians they were bound to protect. A map captured from Al Qaeda in Iraq in December 2006 showed a plan to dominate all of Baghdad by taking control of all the areas surrounding it in a belt and then tightening it.
IMPLEMENTING THE NEW STRATEGY
The progress visible currently in Iraq was unthinkable at that time in late 2006. How did this progress occur? The first job was to protect the Iraqi population where they were. The results of this part of the strategy arrived quickly. In December 2006 Anbar suffered 300 attacks in one week. One year later, the province suffered 30 attacks in a week, a 90% reduction. Currently, Anbar experiences about 20 attacks a week. Similar results appeared in Baghdad. Sectarian attacks decreased by over 80% this past year. The cycle of violence has been broken.
While it is tempting for those involved in implementing the new strategy to exaggerate the effects of the new strategy, it is also an ignorant oversimplification to state that the positive trends are merely the result of “paying off” insurgents and Sadr’s decision to stand down. The most important factor was the change in strategy: taking back Baghdad block by block; allying with local groups, many of whom joined the effort from a position of weakness, not strength; gaining the trust of ordinary Iraqi citizens; dividing and conquering the Baghdad “support zone” of Al Qaeda in Iraq, forcing Al Qaeda in Iraq to shift far away from the city; driving the militias out of the country (most went to Iran or southern Iraq). The Mahdi army actually became confused by the changes, and many of their officers overreacted. Sadr has actually been compelled by circumstances to recharacterize his militia as a humanitarian organization.
What accomplished all these things was partnering side-by-side with Iraqis every single day. Much of the progress comes from these ordinary citizens. Iraqis were able to stand up for themselves without fear of retribution. The Sons of Iraq (formerly the Concerned Local Citizens), an organization of neighborhood watch groups, was formed. Their members, now numbering over 80,000, were initially Sunnis who were weary and wary of a government dominated by the Shia. In the Sons of Iraq, these Iraqis removed themselves from extremist groups, gained employment and training, and prepared themselves to join the Iraqi Security Forces. They wanted to be part of a legitimate organization.
With the increasing security, fast economic development has taken place. In one Baghdad market, the number of stands went from 40 to 400. Serious political progress has also taken place, starting locally and then spreading to the national level. The Iraqi Parliament has done several things in the last couple months: established a process to grant amnesty to former Ba’athist officials and employ them in the new government; agreed on a budget; continued to distribute oil revenues to the provinces; and announced the first municipal elections (this provision was vetoed, but the problem is expected to be resolved soon). The key now is to implement and expand upon these political agreements.
THE QUESTION PERIOD
Gen. Odierno took a number of questions for about 30 minutes. A reporter asked his opinion of the latest “uptick” in violence, and Gen. Odierno retorted that American soldiers suffered the lowest number of casualties ever in February, although there had been a slight increase in casualties in January due to increased operations.
In response to other questions, Gen. Odierno discussed the steadily increasing allocation of money by the national government to the provincial governments. Conceding that unemployment remained a major problem, he discussed the newly-created Civilian Service Corps, run by the Multi-National Forces in Iraq, which employs members of the Sons of Iraq in public projects such as repairing sewers and utilities. Eventually, the program will be transferred to the Iraqi government. Another problem Gen. Odierno mentioned was illiteracy. Many men lack the literacy to do more than physical labor.
Asked whether the success of the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy is specific to Iraq or can be used by the military in other countries in the future, Gen. Odierno indicated that the experience would be valuable elsewhere. Iraq is “COIN-plus,” he said, because there are additional problems that other COIN operations would not normally face, such as sectarian division and the fragility of the national government. He believed that the military must integrate its experience in irregular warfare while maintaining its capacities for conventional warfare.
Discussing the success of protecting and working with Iraqis in their own neighborhoods rather than retiring to central U.S. bases every night, Gen. Odierno said that Iraqis in the street often know American soldiers by name and will even ask after soldiers who are absent from patrols. Ordinary Iraqis are also giving the MNF-I many more tips. Three times the number of weapons caches found in 2006 were found in 2007. IED clearance has jumped to 60% (it had never gotten above 40% before). Iraqis feel comfortable with Americans.
I introduced myself as a blogger at RedState and at http://www.win-the-war.com/ and asked him what advocates of perseverance and victory should tell the American public to prepare them for the long-term. “Gen. Petraeus has said a successful COIN strategy takes nine to ten years,” I said, “So does this mean that American troops will be engaged in combat operations for ten more years, and that large numbers of troops, say, 100,000 or more, will remain there for ten more years?”
Gen. Odierno replied that we are gradually decreasing the number of lethal missions that Americans perform and turning more over to Iraqis. Proceeding slowly and deliberately was essential, he added, because much depends on various conditions, such as the tribal, political, and economic conditions. “What we can’t have,” he emphasized, “is sudden changes.” He predicted that 100,000 troops would not be necessary for many more years, that substantially fewer would be deployed at the end of another decade. He repeated, however, that the removal of our troops must depend on the improvement of the Iraqi situation, and stressed that the COIN strategy involved not only inter-agency military and political cooperation, but economic investment, such as that fostered by USAID.
Finally, Gen. Odierno spoke generally about the most pressing issues for the Army in the future. He said that long-term sustainability was necessary, but that present missions must also be accomplished. As he pointed out, there is a natural tension between these two aims. He concluded by declaring that the Army must focus above all on providing soldiers and maintaining a viable force based on soldiers.
As Gen. Odierno exited, the audience gave him a standing ovation.
For additional information on Gen. Odierno and the progress he helped bring about in Iraq, see the comprehensive article by Kim and Frederick Kagan in the latest issue of The Weekly Standard at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/822vfpsz.asp.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment