The Key Differences Between AQI and the Taliban

President Obama has indicated to the New York Times that he might be willing to reach out to moderate portions of the Taliban.

President Barack Obama says he hopes U.S. troops can identify moderate elements of the Taliban and move them toward reconciliation.

...

There may be opportunities to reach out to moderates in the Taliban, but the situation in Afghanistan is more complicated than the challenges the American military faced in Iraq, Obama said.

U.S. troops were able to persuade Sunni Muslim insurgents in Iraq to cooperate in some instances because they had been alienated by the tactics of al-Qaida terrorists.

Obama cautioned that Afghanistan is a less-governed region with a history of fierce independence among tribes, creating a tough set of circumstances for the United States to deal with.

President Obama goes on to say that reaching out to the Taliban is something that military including General Petraeus. Before we attempt to do this though, we must all understand the differences between Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Taliban.

The so called Sunni Awakening that started in the end of 2006 (before Petreaus even arrived back in Iraq) reached out to Iraqi Sunnis that had alligned themselves with AQI. AQI, formed initially by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, had been formed mostly by foreigners, but reached out to locals to act as so called foot soldiers. Throughout 2004-2006, Iraqi Sunnis faced a choice. Either they could move forward with their nation and act nationalistically. In this way, they would move forward as part of a new unity government in a new Iraq. Of course, this would have meant a significant reduction of power, Since Sunnis are a minority ethnically in the country.

On the other hand, the could join up with AQI and get into bed, so to speak, with their ethnic brethren (since AQI were almost exclusively Sunni themselves). Initially, Iraqi Sunnis joined up with AQI. They joined in the insurgency in hopes that AQI would over take the country and they would get power again.

Then, AQI's brutality overplayed its hand. (famously recounted in this Michael Totten piece) Their brutality knew no end. They would beat and rape women that put their vegetables in the wrong order in their grocery bags. They would invite families for dinner and then serve their own child's head on a platter. They would cut off the fingers of men that smoked. Worse than that, this brutality was often perpetrated on the very Sunni Iraqis that had allied themselves with AQI.

As such, when the U.S. reached out to Iraqi Sunnis in late 2006, they had an interested ear. Calling these Iraqi Sunnis "moderates" would be an unsophisticated way of analyzing the situation. The marriage of Iraqi Sunnis and the foreigners that made up the leadership of AQI was one of happenstance and convenience. Furthermore, the Iraqi Sunnis had another natural place to go, alligning themselves with their country, when they turned on AQI.

The dynamic in Afghanistan is entirely different. There are likely so called "moderate" elements of the Taliban, but there are two problems with this identification. First, moderate is a relative term. Choosing a moderate out of the Taliban is like choosing the sober one out of a bunch of drunks. Second, even if there are truly moderate elements, how do we identify them? With Iraqi Sunnis, it was easy. The Taliban is not a new group like AQI was. It's both a nationalistic movement and an ideological one. No one in the movement is obviously someone that would be moderate.

So, I say, please try and reach out to the "moderate" Taliban, Mr. President. Before you do though, please know which one is moderate and what you have to offer them.

O'Reilly Vs. Obama I

O'Reilly showed part one of his interview. It was a fairly short segment and it focused on foreign policy. Here is a link to the video.




Here is some analysis. First, Barack Obama says there is a GWOT, however he appears to catalogue our enemy. He identified Al Qaeda and the Taliban specifically as part of the GWOT. He went on to say that there all sorts of other networks all over the world included in the enemy. This is reasonable. There are dozens if not hundreds of terrorist groups.

What was interesting was when asked if Iran was part of the GWOT, he gave a qualified answer. He said they were but a different part. He catalogued terrorists in Sunni and Shia. Of course, tactically it is important to treat Shia different from Sunni but I am not sure that you can divide the GWOT into Sunni and Shia terrorists. He then alluded to the war in Iraq being a distraction even though Saddam was a Sunni just like Al Qaeda. He makes a very confusing distinctions that he never explained fully and unfortunately O'Reilly didn't follow up.

Obama said that the military option would always be on the table when dealing with Iran. He said that we haven't "exhausted" our diplomatic options. He made some vague allusions that we haven't put enough pressure on the Europeans. This is, to me at least, a critic's mentality. The Bush administration has been working with the Europeans for much of the last two administrations. On Iran, my partisan analysis is that he has a naive idea that he can apply "pressure" that folks over decades have tried and failed. This is nonsense. The Europeans have no will, and the Iranians are determined to create this confrontation. I came away with the notion that Obama's diplomatic ideas with regard to Iran are as naive as I have always thought they were.

He insisted that Afghanistan is the center of the GWOT. He agreed with O'Reilly that without the cooperation of Pakistan we are going to have great difficulty in winning there. With regards to Pakistan, once again, I took away that he has a naive critic's mentality. Once again, he said that we aren't "putting enough pressure on the Pakistani government". He said we offer them military aid but don't ask for "enough democratic reforms" in return. First, he really doesn't know what Bush asks for in private. Second, Pakistan is an extremely complicated place. The notion that if we put more Democratic pressure that complicated country will suddenly straighten up is naive.

On UBL, he said that he wouldn't send in ground troops but would take any shot at him, from the air I suppose, that he got. Of course, this is exactly the same as the current policy and so while he's spent the last four years criticizing George Bush for not getting UBL, it appears that he will have the exact same strategy.

On Iraq, he did finally acknowledge that the surge has succeeded. Here is the relevant portion.

I think that the surge has succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated,” Obama said while refusing to retract his initial opposition to the surge. “I’ve already said it’s succeeded beyond our wildest dreams.”

Now, O'Reilly gave him a bit of a lifeline here. O'Reilly said that he believed that history would be with him that Iraq was in and of itself a mistake. (a point I disagree with and will address in a future post) Giving him that lifeline, O'Reilly then challenged him to admit that he was wrong on the surge. Obama refused and justified his refusal by saying that the Iraqis have not done enough politically. This is ironically absurd. Only days ago the Iraqis took over Anbar. This is the latest Iraqi progress. They have now either completed or are well on their way to completing 15 of 18 of the original benchmarks. More importantly, Maliki recently took on the Sadrites in Basrah. This operation was lead by Iraqi troops. Within a month of this operation, he sent in troops to lead an operation in Mosul against the remnants of AQI. They're near an oil sharing law, regional elections, and de Baathification. I would say that compared to the body Barack Obama currently occupies, the Iraqi government has made plenty of progress.

Here is ,part 2, and part 3, and part 4

Counter Insurgency: The Key to Our Iraqi Success

I think that any objective observer will have to say that so far Barack Obama's overseas trip has been successful politically. He has looked comfortable, statesmanlike, and he has commanded respect. Furthermore, this was the difficult part and he still has the softballs of Europe left. That said, his weakest area has been his insistence over and over that voting against the surge was not a mistake. It was something he told Terry Moran on Nightline and something he repeated to Katie Couric on CBS News last night. Furthermore, he has tried to cloud the issue by suggesting that the surge was not primarily responsible for the stunning turnaround in Iraq.

In fact, the surge per se was not primarily responsible. John McCain often says that it wasn't merely a surge of troops that made the difference but a change in strategy. It was. When things were at their worst, John McCain once referred to our strategy as whack a mole. By this he meant that our search and destroy missions would eliminate a target in one area only to find that or other targets pop up in other areas. Our problem during the difficult days from 2003-2007 was that our troops would move into an area and attack a target. After their mission was complete though, they would move back to their base. The enemy would wait until our troops had left the area and move back in to cause havoc. Since the locals could not count on the coalition for constant protection, the rise of militias occurred.

Each of the militias didn't merely attack those of other sects, they also provided protections for those of their own sect. This is what brought the country to the brink of civil war.

As such, General David Petraeus, who had recently finished writing the U.S. Army Counter Insurgency Field Manual, was brought in to execute a strategy of counter insurgency. Last August, I debated a liberal friend of mine on the fundamentals of counter insurgency in Iraq. Following the KISS (keep in simple stupid) philosophy on counter insurgency, it boils down to three words: clear, hold and build.

The clearing portion of counter insurgency is the most difficult and most dangerous. The extra troops were most necessary for this portion. This involves going into each and every locale with any modicum of terrorist activity and engaging them in street hand to hand combat. This is brutal and bloody, but ultimately necessary. Many will remember that the beginning of the surge brought a spike in violence. That's the unfortunate effect of the clearing portion. If you take the fight to the enemy, there will be more casualties. That said, once the enemy is defeated and driven from an area, the hardest part is over. In fact, the so called clearing portion is still going on in remnants. The coalition, along with Iraqi troops, only a couple months ago confronted terrorists in Basrah, Sadr City, and Mosul.

Once the clearing portion is successfully accomplished, the next step is holding an area. This requires maintaining a significant though smaller presence within each area. It works much like the military version of police precincts. By maintaining a presence, the locals feel a permanent sense of safety. This portion of counter insurgency also involves very dangerous military activity. Much of it involves house to house searches. During this portion of counter insurgency, the coalition must make sure that all the remaining remnants of the terrorists are identified and removed. The terrorists wear no uniforms and blend in with the locals. As such, this involves sophisticated interrogation. Beyond that, this also becomes the military equivalent of grass roots politics. This portion involves reaching out to local leaders and attempting to flip bad guys to our side.

By holding an area, the enemy is denied a base of operation. Many may remember stories from the fall and winter of last year that surmised that the sphere of space that AQI could operate in was becoming smaller. That's because the coalition was moving into territory once controlled by them clearing and holding it. Thus, the enemy couldn't come back. It was successful clear and hold that turned Ramadi from one of the most dangerous areas in the world to one of the safest Iraqi cities.

Once the hold portion of counter insurgency began to blossom, this is when we saw much of the militias crumble and disintegrate. That's because they were no longer needed for protection. Once the locals had no use for their protection, they began to see them solely for the evil creatures that they were. As most remember, Sadr began to lose significant power during the fall of last year. That's because clearing began to take hold and thus his JAM militia became flat footed.

The final portion of counter insurgency is building. This involves serious money being thrown around for economic development. The locals must feel as though a better day is ahead. The only way that happens is when they see their economy blossom. If safety is followed by economic misery, their good will won't last. That is what is happening throughout much of Iraq now.

Clear, hold and build happen with their own dynamic, and thus, different portions of operations happen in different areas. Still, this textbook implementation of clear, hold and build is what turned the dire situation in Iraq into one in which we are on the verge of victory.

There is no doubt that the so called Sunni Awakening was a significant help in implementing the counter insurgency. It is further true that the awakening happened before the counter insurgency was implemented. As I pointed out earlier, flipping important community leaders is a hallmark of counter insurgency. It is, however, naive and uninformed to suggest that the Sunni Awakening would have had any effect had it not been for the counter insurgency strategy. To suggest that these Sunni locals would have been able to take on AQI on their own without the massive reinforcements of the coalition's counter insurgency strategy is naive and irresponsible. This suggestion by Senator Obama is nothing less than exhibit A of his utter ignorance of the military situation in Iraq.

Of course, the surge and counter insurgency wouldn't have worked without local cooperation and the increasing competence of the central government. In fact, proper counter insurgency creates a dynamic in which all of these things begin to function with each other. For Senator Obama to suggest that any of them would have worked without the counter insurgency strategy is simply naive and outrageous.

Make no mistake, we are on the brink of victory because General David Petraeus along with several hundred thousand of the bravest and finest military personnel performed a picture perfect textbook implementation the counter insurgency concepts of clear, hold and build. This is the strategy that was supported in its infancy by John McCain and opposed by Barack Obama. Make no mistake, without it, we would be mired in a bloody genocide that no one wants to imagine. We can debate future strategy, however, there is no debating what got us here.

Al Qaeda Decimated WAPO Reports

The right blogosphere is buzzing today about a new report from the CIA that paints a picture of Al Qaeda, totally decimated, and near total defeat. This is frankly not new. Such reports surface from time to time, and frankly, plenty of reports surface that say much the opposite. What's different about this report is that it is cited in the front page of the Washington Post. Normally, positive news about the GWOT is either not cited at all or buried deep in its pages. This particular report is startling in its upbeat analysis.

On balance, we are doing pretty well," he said, ticking down a list ofaccomplishments: "Near strategic defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al-Qaeda globally -- and here I'm going to use the word 'ideologically' -- as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam," he said.

The sense of shifting tides in the terrorism fight is shared by a number of terrorism experts, though some caution that it is too early to tell whether the gains are permanent. Some credit Hayden and other U.S. intelligence leaders for going on the offensive against al-Qaeda in the area along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where the tempo of Predator strikes has dramatically increased from previous years. But analysts say the United States has caught some breaks in the past year, benefiting from improved conditions in Iraq, as well as strategic blunders by al-Qaeda that have cut into its support base.

Now, we all know the Democratic mantra. It's summed up rather nicely by Barack Obama.

America's standing has suffered. Our diplomacy has been compromised by a refusal to talk to people we don't like. Our alliances have been compromised by bluster. Our credibility has been compromised by a faulty case for war. Our moral leadership has been compromised by Abu Ghraib. That is a cost of this war. Perhaps the saddest irony of the Administration's cynical use of 9/11 is that the Iraq War has left us less safe than we were before 9/11.

Osama bin Ladin and his top lieutenants have rebuilt a new base in Pakistan where they freely train recruits, plot new attacks, and disseminate propaganda. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan. Iran has emerged as the greatest strategic challenge to America in the Middle East in a generation. Violent extremism has increased. Terrorism has increased.

All of that is a cost of this war. After 9/11, instead of the politics of unity, we got a political strategy of division with the war in Iraq as its centerpiece. The only thing we were asked to do for our country was support a misguided war. We lost that sense of common purpose as Americans. And we're not going to be a truly united and resolute America until we can stop holding our breath, until we can come together to reclaim our foreign policy and our politics and end this war that has cost us so much.

Clearly, if you believe this report, everything that Obama said in this particular speech is just plain wrong. Of course, spin and propaganda become fact if they aren't challenged. The Democrats have tried to use each and every negative report to paint a picture of a failed GWOT policy. When the NIE suggested that Iraq was being used as a "cause celebre" by jihadists, the Democrats pounced on it and milked the report for every last bit of political juice.

The lesson is that perception is reality. The Republicans now have a credible report to make the case that we are safer. They now have the kind of credibility necessary to push back against the scurrilous attacks of the Democrats that make it seem as though everything that has happened over the last seven years vis a vis the GWOT has been a failure. The only question is whether or not they will use it to make their case.

AQI Leader Arrested

The leader of AQI has been apprehended in Mosul.

The leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, was arrested in the northern city of Mosul, the Iraqi Defense Ministry spokesman said Thursday.

Spokesman Mohammed al-Askari said the arrest of al-Masri, also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, was confirmed to him by the Iraqi commander of the province. There was no immediate confirmation or comment from U.S. forces on the arrest.

Al Masri has been the leader of AQI since the summer of 2006 when the coalition killed the original leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. Following his death it also lead to a treasure trove of intelligence. Let's hope the same thing happens now.

The Storm Before the Calm

Michael Yon gives his latest dispatch regarding Iraq. While he spent many years there he has been back in the states for more than a month. He puts forth the supposition that we have taken on more casualties because we have confronted the Shia militias and that this is a necessary, if not violent, confrontation that will ultimately lead to a more peaceful nation.

He makes the comparison, and contrast, to the campaign the coalition undertook against the Sunni militias. He points out that we had significant casualties then as well in the beginning.

We are taking more casualties now, just as we did in the first part of 2007, because we have taken up the next crucial challenge of this war: confronting the Shia militias.

In early 2007, under the leadership of Gen. David Petraeus, we began to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign against the reign of terror Al Qaeda in Iraq
had established over much of the midsection of the country. That campaign, which moved many of our troops off of big centralized bases and out into small neighborhood outposts, carried real risks.

In every one of the first eight months of 2007, we lost more soldiers than we had the previous year. Only as the campaign bore fruit - in the form of Iraqi citizens working with American soldiers on a daily basis, helping uncover terrorist hideouts together - did the casualty numbers begin to improve.

He points out that the same confrontation must be made with the Shia militias (lead by JAM of Al Sadr fame)

To comprehend our strategy here, we need to understand the goals of these militias, which pundits, politicians and the press all too often gloss over. Al Qaeda's aim was to destroy Iraq in civil war. Allegedly devout Muslims, the terrorist savages were willing to rape, murder and pillage their own people just as long as they could catch America in the middle. One reason Al Qaeda in Iraq can regenerate so quickly, despite being hated by most Iraqis, is that, armed with generous funding from outside Iraq, they mostly recruit young men and boys from Iraqi street gangs, giving them money, guns and drugs.

Yon goes on to point out that unlike AQI, which simply wanted death and destruction all over Iraq, JAM has political goals. They want power in Iraq. Yon points out that a school of thought might be that we shouldn't take them on then. Here is why he thinks that school of thought is wrong.

Because the militias are strong, well-organized and long had deep support among the population, and because their goal is political power, not random destruction, some have argued that we should have nothing to do with taking them on. They predict a bloody and futile campaign that would make us once again enemies of the Iraqi people rather than their defenders.

These critics miss a crucial on-the-ground reality: Virtually all insurgencies, however noble their original purpose, eventually degenerate into criminal organizations, classic Mafia-like protection rackets, especially as they achieve their original goals.

With Al Qaeda mostly wiped out of Baghdad, the militias that once defended Shia neighborhoods now prey on them. In Basra to the south, where al Qaeda always feared to tread, the situation is even worse. Practically speaking, that city has been ruled by an uneasy coalition of rival Shia gangs for years.

In Yon's opinion, this is the next major battle inside Iraq, and winning it will go a long way toward lasting peace there.

AQI Suffers Heavy Losses

According to this story the last month has not been a good one for many AQI LEADERS.

Between mid-March and mid-April, al Qaeda suffered major losses in Iraq. American and Iraqi troops killed or captured 53 al Qaeda leaders. These include men in charge of entire cities (or portions of large cities like Mosul or Baghdad), as well as men in charge of various aspects of terror operations (making bombs, placing them or minding the bombers). Most important, nine of the ten most senior men involved, were captured, and interrogated. This led to locating more al Qaeda staff, and assets. Hundreds of weapons and explosives caches...

Mind you this is 53 LEADERS not merely members of AQI. Leader is a bit of a nebulous term though I am confident that the military defines things better than the folks in Congress do vis a vis the mortgage business.

Tough Times for AQI

That is the title of a recent blog post at Power Line. The proof is in the pudding so to speak, and the pudding is the simple raw numbers. First, as we have already pointed out along with the begrudging support of the Mainstream Media, deaths for the good guys are down, and down a lot. Now, the numbers are in for AQI for September.
during the month of September, 29 senior AQI operatives were either killedor captured. Five were Emirs at the city level or higher in the AQI leadershipstructure. Nine were geographical or functional cell leaders. Eleven werefacilitors who supported foreign terrorist weapons movements.When Coalition Forces killed one AQI Emir, they captured more than 400documents, three computer hard drives, two thumb drives, and eleven compactdisc. Among other things, this treasure trove revealed that the names of 500foreign terrorists being recruited by al Qaeda, including the recruiters' names,and the date and route of entry into Iraq. The terrorists came from a range offoreign countries including Libya, Morocco, Syria, Algeria, Oman, Yemen,Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom.The documents also provided information about financial transactions involved inthe movements of each foreign terrorist.The coalition is not letting up. Word out of Baghdad is the MNF just announce the capture of another major financier
Iraqi forces, with U.S. Special Forces as advisers, detained twoindividuals believed to be linked to the al-Qaeda in Iraq criminal network Oct.2, near Baghdad. During one of the operations, Soldiers from the 6th Iraqi ArmyDivision detained a suspected al-Qaeda financier in Kindi. The extremistfinancier is suspected of traveling to foreign countries to acquire financialsupport for terrorist activities and is suspected of supplying more than $50,000to al-Qaeda each month.He is believed to have received $100,000,000 this summer from terroristsupporters who cross the Iraq border illegally or fly into Iraq from Italy,Syria and Egypt. The terrorist is linked to financing cells in Doura, Tarmiyahand Baqubah, and uses a leather merchant business as a front to smuggle weaponsand explosives from surrounding countries. Intelligence shows he has stores inFallujah, Syria and Jordan.I have said it over and over. This enemy won't roll over and die. The news is not all positive, Izzat Al-Douri, the highest Saddam henchman who remains at large, has just announced the formation of an umbrella insurgency that includes 22 obscure groups.
Nearly two dozen previously unknown Iraqi insurgent groups announced a newcoalition to fight foreign occupation but it also set conditions for talks withthe U.S. in a statement on a Web site affiliated with the country's deposedBaath party.The 22 groups said their leader is Izzat al-Douri, the highest rankingmember of Saddam Hussein's former ruling party still at large.In the nearly half hour video message, an unidentified man, face blurred,was shown sitting behind a table with an Iraqi flag on his right side reading astatement announcing the formation of the new alliance called "The Jihad andLiberation."The new alliance laid down a series of conditions for talks with the U.S.It demanded an unconditional withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq, immediatelyor within a short timetable, the release of all detainees, return of thesecurity forces to their status before the occupation and a halt to alloperations against the people.The effectiveness of this group remains to be sign however their olive branch for negotiations certainly raises questions of their legitimacy and also makes me wonder how strong their ties are within the current political structure. It would be nice if Douri joined Saddam in their own corner of hell, or if not, in a cell next to KSM, but the dynamics are ripe for the good guys. So far, the first four days of October have seen the violence continue at the pace of the month of September and that was of course dramatically down. I have heard of no reported deaths of U.S. soldiers yet (knock on wood), and I have only heard of one car bomb that killed eleven. There will be more death and the violence continues to be unacceptably too high, however the momentum is there. Now, our forces must maintain it. I know they can and I will be praying for their continued strength, courage and of course safety.

Anatomy of an Assassination

Update: The assassination of Abu Rishad continues to be shrouded in mystery, however here is how the story probably went down.

I just read this piece and all I could think of was The Godfather. (For the two people in this world who have not seen the Godfather I am about to reveal a crucial plot point) It was the part where Michael is betrayed by his bodyguard but his wife is in the car when it blows up. Here is the inside story of the assassination of Abu Risha, leader of the Anbar Salvation Front.

He said that al-Barghouti had been in debt to some people in the car smuggling racket in Mosul who were affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The men in the car smuggling racket had a deal with AQI: the terror group would allow them to operate, guaranteeing their security, and in return they would pass information to AQI about who was in debt to them. The men in the smuggling racket passed on information about al-Barghouti's debt, and AQI told them topressure on him to repay the debt immediately -- something he was unable to do.

This put al-Barghouti in a no-win situation. He couldn't go to the authorities because doing so would have exposed his corruption and illegal activities. Then AQI approached him to offer a way out: they would repay his debt in exchange for al-Barghouti admitting al-Rishawi's assassin to the compound, and not asking too many questions while he was on the way in. In this way, AQI created problems for al-Barghouti in order to proffer the solution.

The more you read about Al Qaeda the more you realize that in many ways these guys operate no different than the average mafioso. Only they are more vicious, religious zealots, and if possible much more evil.